The British deployment in Central Java 1945

The British deployment in Central Java was as confused and improvised as their deployment in West Java, arguably more so since they came to rely on Japanese assistance to an embarrassing extent. It had not originally been the British intention to go into Central Java at all. The second priority, after the evacuation of Batavia, was Surabaya, Java’s second largest city and an important naval base. But such plans had been drawn up at a time when the British were ignorant of the numbers and locations of internee camps. With the deployment of the relief teams in September and their discovery of thousands of internees in Semarang and in the interior of Central Java, it became clear that a force would have to be despatched to protect them and gather them in. In this way, the occupation of Surabaya in East Java became the third and not the second priority. The protection of the internees in Central Java came to assume great importance when it was discovered that Indonesian ‘extremists’ were surrounding the camps and refusing to let food in.

As in West Java, the force earmarked for the deployment in Central Java was far too small for the task it had to perform in the midst of potentially hostile territory. Before the arrival of troops at Semarang, leaflets were dropped there and at Ambarawa in the interior stating that these troops were coming to disarm the Japanese. This was ironic in view of subsequent developments. In the early morning of 19 October, 3/10th Gurkha Rifles under the command of LieutenantColonel Edwardes arrived in the harbour of Semarang. The harbour itself was virtually deserted but firing could be heard in the centre of the town. When the leading company reached the centre of the town, it came under fire from government buildings and suffered casualties of two killed and seven wounded. Indonesians who were carrying a white flag reported that the firing was coming from the Japanese troops in the town. Contact was eventually made with their commander, Major Kido, who offered ‘profuse apologies’ for what had happened and explained that, since his forces had been fighting with Indonesians that morning and since he himself had been unaware of the arrival of the Gurkhas, he had assumed that the arrival of the troops heralded a renewal of the morning’s fighting.

Major Kido had commanded a Japanese battalion in Ambarawa. He had left Ambarawa and gone to Semarang. On arriving in Semarang, his troops discovered that 200 Japanese civilians had been imprisoned and then killed in the town prison by Indonesian ‘extremists’. By way of retaliation, the Japanese force had killed 2,000 Indonesians, hence the fighting which the Gurkhas had been caught up in on arrival. The Gurkhas soon took over the airfield in Semarang and Headquarters were established. Their presence was apparently welcomed by local Indonesians because it brought an end to retaliatory measures by the Japanese.

On arriving in Semarang, the Gurkha battalion received instructions from 23rd Indian Division Headquarters on how it was to set about its tasks. An Operational Instruction stated that all ranks should bear in mind that their duties were solely to protect the internees in the town and to maintain ‘law and order’. It was specifically stipulated that the battalion was not to take sides in ‘political matters’ nor to enter into ‘political discussions’ with local leaders. ‘You may however meet local leaders in connection with RAPWI matters and give RAPWI opportunity to do the same’.

Accordingly, a meeting was arranged between the Commander of the battalion and Indonesian Republican leaders in Semarang, among whom was Wonsonogoro, the Governor of Central Java. At this meeting, it was agreed that the Indonesian Republican police force in Semarang would be allowed to retain its own arms but that it would disarm ordinary Indonesian civilians.

Shortly after 3/10th Gurkhas had established themselves in Semarang, detachments were sent into the interior, to Ambarawa and Magelang, to establish a presence and make contact with the internees. Initially, a company was sent to Ambarawa and, once arrived, a platoon was sent on to Magelang. This was a dangerously small force to despatch into potentially hostile territory. At first, however, the platoon was welcomed by the local population.

Reinforcements were sent to Semarang, then to Ambarawa, enabling the Gurkha battalion to move inland. In due course, the whole battalion came to be based in Magelang. By the end of October, the battalion’s Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, had arrived in the town. He held a meeting with the town’s Republican Resident and other local leaders. At this meeting, tensions became apparent over such issues as the wearing of badges of rank by the few Dutch officers who were in the town and British requisitioning of transport. The conference came to an end with the following exchanges which illustrate the lack of agreement:

British Commander: I want co-operation which I find lacking to-day.
Indonesian leaders: We are co-operating.
British Commander: But not enough.
Indonesian leaders: When we are sure that RAPWI is not a cloak for NICA we will co-operate.
British Commander: Have you any evidence of this?
Indonesian leaders: No.
British Commander: Anyway it is political and nothing to do with me.

The next day, a force of 5,000 Indonesian ‘extremists’ attacked the British battalion. The attacking force possessed artillery and mortars. One of the Gurkha companies was cut off and it became necessary to summon Japanese reinforcements from Ambarawa. A company of Major Kido’s battalion under the command of a certain Captain Yamada set out on its rescue mission. Five kilometres north of Magelang, this force met Indonesian resistance. A British detachment from Magelang managed to counter this resistance by the use of mortars and the Japanese force was consequently able to fight its way into Magelang to join the beleaguered British garrison. High level negotiations were soon entered into in an attempt to bring the fighting to an end. At the request of local Indonesian leaders, Brigadier Bethell, the Commander of an improvised Brigade formation of 23rd Indian Division which had by this time arrived in Semarang, and Sukarno, the President of the Indonesian Republic, arrived in Magelang on 2 November. A conference was held at which it was agreed that the attacking Indonesian troops would withdraw from their positions and that a Contact Committee would be formed consisting of five Indonesian leaders and five British officers ‘to ensure that the task of looking after the internees was accomplished peacefully’.

The first meeting of the newly established Contact Committee was held on 3 November. According to the British, the meeting ‘began badly but finished on good terms’. It was also noted: ‘Situation appears improved. Contact Team endeavouring to replace general mistrust by confidence.’ The next day, a meeting of the Contact Committee was rudely interrupted when boxes of three inch mortar ammunition which were being dropped by air by the RAF came through the roof of the building in which the meeting was being held. This can have done little to assist Anglo–Indonesian harmony. In the days that followed, the Contact Committee meetings became more tense and the British began to fear a renewal of widespread fighting with Indonesian forces. All this time, the work of bringing in the internees into Magelang itself from the outlying camps went ahead.

By 20 November, 2,500 internees had been evacuated from Magelang. The British and Indonesian representatives now reached an agreement that the Indonesian Republican authorities would provide the British with petrol and anything else they needed provided the British garrison withdrew once the evacuation of internees had been completed.

On 21 November, therefore, the British garrison and the remaining internees pulled out of Magelang. All those who were sick, the aged and small children were put in lorries; the remainder had to walk. This slow moving and vulnerable column of troops and civilians caused General Christison, back at Headquarters in Batavia, to think of the British retreat from Kabul in 1842 when a group similarly composed had tried to get back to India. Repeatedly attacked by Afghan tribesmen, one of the British Regiments had made a stand at Gandamack and been wiped out. Only one man from the original exodus reached India. It was an apt if inauspicious comparison on Christison’s part. The convoy from Ambarawa was frequently attacked and on one occasion was held up by a mined bridge. A relief column had to be despatched from Ambarawa to bring it safely into the town.

The situation in Ambarawa had been equally precarious. Fighting had broken out on 20 November. Indonesians blocked roads and sniped British positions, making full use of the mortars and machine-guns which they possessed. The RAF was called in both to carry out supply drops on beleaguered British positions and to strafe Indonesian positions. On the ground, the British had to resort to using tanks and artillery. The column of troops and internees from Magelang arrived in Ambarawa to find a scene of confusion and chaos. Indonesians had poured petrol round one internee camp and set fire to it; they had broken through the rear fence of another and killed British troops and women and children. Over the following days, Indonesians shelled the internee camps and this caused many casualties. All this time, the internees were steadily evacuated to Semarang, a task which was completed by 8 December. Just under a week later, the British garrison pulled out of Ambarawa.

The situation was equally disturbed in Semarang at this time. The initially harmonious relations which had prevailed between the British and Indonesians soon gave way to hostilities. Trouble began in earnest on 17 November. Three British officers belonging to 2/19th Hyderabad, Major Appana, Captain Sur and Lieutenant Dalvi, were escorting some women from one camp to another when their car broke down. Armed Indonesians dressed in civilian clothes came up to the car and demanded that the officers surrender their arms.

Before anything could be done one of the Indonesians pointed his pistol at a woman in the back of the car. One of the officers tried to protect the woman and was shot dead. Another of the officers tried to close with the man and he too was shot dead. The third officer, Lieutenant Dalvi, and one of the women managed to escape to the house of a Chinese from where they managed, with the aid of the Indonesian Republican police, to return to the safety of the British lines but Lieutenant Dalvi had at some point during the encounter been badly wounded. He died in hospital the following day. All three officers had been expected at a conference called by the Commanding Officer of 2/19th Hyderabad for the evening of 17 November. Their absence alerted him to the fact that something was wrong. When it was discovered what had happened, British troops went into action, rounding up all armed Indonesians, including the Republican police. Extensive fighting now broke out with Indonesian forces in Semarang. In seven days of fighting, between 18 and 25 November, 2/ 19th Hyderabad suffered casualties of 13 wounded. Indonesian casualties were far greater. The situation became dangerous for the British when pockets of their troops were isolated and Indonesians established strongpoints in buildings. The RAF were called in to drop bombs and strafe roads. British troops then attempted to demolish Indonesian roadblocks and clear the town, although a shortage of troops prevented a close search for weapons. Further Indonesian attacks were dealt with by means of gunfire from British warships which had arrived in Semarang harbour. After this, the situation quietened down.

By December 1945, the British adventure in Central Java was over. They had gone into the interior in insufficient strength in order to rescue the many internees there and had been forced by adverse circumstances to pull out, withdrawing both their own troops and the internees to the comparative safety of Semarang, on the coast. By 3 December, 9,400 internees had been withdrawn into Semarang. Despite their initial professions to the Indonesian population of Central Java that they had come to disarm the Japanese, the British had been obliged to rely heavily on Japanese military assistance during the course of operations against Indonesian forces in Semarang, Ambarawa and Magelang. During the course of these joint operations, it is evident that a certain degree of mutual respect and admiration had sprung up between these erstwhile adversaries. The Japanese company under Captain Yamada which had fought its way into Magelang to assist the British had returned to Semarang. An unpublished Japanese account of the activities of Major Kido’s force in Central Java contains the following statement about the return of this unit to Semarang: ‘Brigadier BETHEL, CRA, expressing his appreciation for the services rendered by YAMADA …, inspected his troops on their returning to SEMARANG. All the officers and men were deeply impressed by this exceptional honour.’

So impressed was General Christison with Japanese military assistance in Central Java that he recommended Major Kido for a Distinguished Service Order.

Taken from "THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF INDONESIA 1945–1946 Britain, the Netherlands and the Indonesian revolution" by Richard McMillan

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